By Connie Reguli.

The plight in how to maintain your rights as a parent while in prison is real.

States, help families stay together by correcting a consequence of the Adoption and Safe Families Act

Washington governor Inslee signs new Bill.

New Law Gives Parents Behind Bars in Washington State a Way to Hold Onto Their Children

August 31, 2020

BY Senior Scholar, Dean Institute for Corporate Governance and Integrity, Lipscomb University

A Legal Overview Of Section 1983 Civil Rights Litigation

04/14/2017 11:12 am ET Updated Apr 14, 2017

A Legal Overview of Section 1983 Civil Rights Litigation

If a governmental police department, in contrast to a private security company, was involved in the recently widely reported removal of a passenger from an airplane, there is a possibility, depending upon the specific facts, of a successful Section 1983 lawsuit that would impose liability upon that governmental entity. Police action may extend liability for injuries such as assault and battery to government in addition to private individuals and businesses.

The federal Civil Rights Act of 1871 (yes, 1871), also known as the Ku Klux Klan Act, was part of post Civil War legal developments that include the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments. This comment briefly provides an incomplete educational overview of litigation under this significant legislation. Always consult an experienced attorney in all civil rights cases.

42 U.S.C. Section 1983:

“Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress, except that in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer’s judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable. For the purposes of this section, any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia shall be considered to be a statute of the District of Columbia.”

Dormant Until the 1960s

Very little Section 1983 litigation occurred until the U.S. Supreme Court’s 1961 decision in Monroe v. Pape. This case involved a warrantless breaking into a home by 13 Chicago police officers. While the city of Chicago could not be sued (municipal liability was added in 1978) the police officers could be sued as acting “under the color of state law” even though they were not authorized and may have been forbidden to act. This decision allowed individual governmental employees to be sued for acts that violate the Constitution or statutes.

Meaning of “Person”

The judicial interpretation of “person” under Section 1983 is complex and requires that one seek experienced legal counsel. The following provides only an extremely brief and incomplete overview.

The Supreme Court has decided that a state and state agencies are not “persons” subject to suit under Section 1983. However, municipalities and other local governmental units such as school districts may be sued when official policies are in clear violation of constitutional rights according to the Supreme Court’s 1978 decision in Monell v. Department of Social Services.

One cannot sue a state officer under Section 1983 for the typical actions routinely undertaken in an official capacity. For example, denying a driver’s license due to a failing grade on a driving test does not create a Section 1983 case. However, merely being an official does not provide blanket immunity for the violation of an individual’s rights.

A 1971 Supreme Court decision, Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, stated that lawsuits could be brought for violations of Fourth Amendment rights even in the absence of a statute that authorizes litigation holding, in essence, for every wrong there is a remedy. The Bivens decision has been interpreted broadly to allow lawsuits for a variety of violations, such as “excessive force,” unless a specific statute clearly provides an alternative remedy or some special factors mitigate against allowing the particular lawsuit.

Purely private persons or businesses not acting under “color of state law” are immune from a Section 1983 lawsuit [Morris v. Dillard’s Department Stores, Fifth Circuit, 2001]. Other state tort (personal injury) legal remedies may exist.

Acting Under “Color of State Law”

The Supreme Court has traditionally indicated that “color of state law” means power “possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state law” [West v. Atkins, 1988]. This means that a state employee performing a governmental function, even if exceeding her/his authority, is acting under color of law. Additionally, a non-governmental person or entity may also act under color of law.

Rights “Secured by the Constitution and Laws”

Section 1983 does not create new legal rights. Rather, it is focused on the violation of existing rights. A given situation may involve state laws and state remedies such as tort (personal injury) law. However, most of the Bill of Rights have been held to apply to state and local entities and officials. Violations of rights such as due process, the Fourth Amendment (searches) and Fifth Amendment (self-incrimination) are common examples.

Immunity Issues

Historically public officials are granted either absolute or qualified immunity from lawsuit (can’t be sued) when performing official duties. Examples of absolute immunity involve a limited group of officials such as the President, legislators, or judges carrying out official duties. Qualified immunity is the general rule for individuals such as police officers and other officials unless they violate clearly established Constitutional rights or act in a grossly unreasonable fashion. The Supreme Court has held that Section 1983 does allow immunity defenses with some caveats. Actions taken with “deliberate indifference” may impose liability [Farmer v. Brennan, 1994]. This is a very high standard beyond negligence (recklessness) and involves conscious disregard.

Bottom of Form

There are numerous Section 1983 First Amendment cases in which harassment and inconvenience, alone, do not produce official liability. Would a “person of ordinary firmness” be deterred from speaking or acting by the official’s conduct? [Friedmann v. Corrections Corporation of America, Ninth Circuit, 2001].

Fourth Amendment cases involving police stops and investigations find no violation of Section 1983 if there were “reasonable suspicion” for the initial stop, and the detention was only long enough to carry out the purposes of the stop. Probable cause exists for an arrest if there is a reasonable belief that criminal activity has occurred, even if a subsequent trial results in a not guilty verdict. As the Supreme Court has stated: “The Constitution does not guarantee that only the guilty will be arrested. If it did, Section 1983 would provide a cause of action for every defendant acquitted — indeed, for every suspect released.” [Baker v. McCollan, 1979].

Off-Duty Incidents

Often off-duty Section 1983 lawsuits involve police officers. Traditional employer liability for an employee’s actions (respondeat superior) will not impose Section 1983 liability on a municipality. Rather, the city must have either an express policy or a well-established custom or common practice that produces a violation of constitutional rights.

Consistently enforced personnel and municipal policies will prevent a claim. For example, a 2016 Fifth Circuit decision involving an off-duty intoxicated Houston police officer who killed an individual involved in a bar fight did not impose liability on the city of Houston since Houston rules prohibited police officers from carrying a firearm while intoxicated [Rodriguez v. City of Houston]. A similar no-municipal-liability decision, with a different factual background, was reached in 2015 by the Seventh Circuit [Rossi v. City of Chicago].

However, off-duty police officers employed as security guards who routinely exercise arrest and booking functions in coordination with business owners and the local police department may impose Section 1983 liability on the municipality [Lusby v. City of Lawton, Tenth Circuit, 1984]. Has the officer acted under an assertion of official status and are the actions in some way connected to this official status, even if exceeding his/her authority? Does a particular local custom rise to level of color of law?

Procedural Considerations

While Section 1983 contains no statute of limitations (time in which a suit must be brought), federal courts tend to apply the personal injury statute of limitations of the state where the action occurred. Also, a plaintiff must possess “standing to sue,” that is a specific concrete actual or imminent injury to himself/herself. One cannot typically seek redress for others. Additionally, the claim must be “ripe.” Is the case one that a court may appropriately decide now rather than await the unfolding of future events? Is the case only hypothetical?

Generally speaking, a successful Section 1983 plaintiff may collect typical state tort compensatory damages such as those for medical expenses, lost income, pain and suffering, emotional distress, reputational injury, etc. Punitive damages are available against individuals (but not municipalities) in cases involving “reckless or callous disregard for the plaintiff’s rights, as well as intentional violations of federal law” [Smith v. Wade, 1983]. Finally, reasonable attorney’s fees and expert witness fees are also available [42 U.S.C. Section 1988]. As a matter of practice, municipalities frequently indemnify their officials and police officers if a financial judgment is rendered against them individually.

A Brief Section 1983 Litigation Checklist

1. Has there been a violation of a Constitutional or statutorily protected right?

2. Is the actor a person that is subject to Section 1983?

3. Did this person act under color of law or local governmental custom or practice?

4. Are the actions complained of connected to the deprivation of rights in a reasonably foreseeable manner (proximate causation)?

5. Are there defenses to liability such as immunity, lack of standing to sue, or a lack of ripeness?

6. Is a monetary judgment collectable from a governmental entity or, in the case of an individual defendant, personal assets or personal insurance policies?

This comment provides a brief and incomplete educational overview of a complex topic and is not intended to provide legal advice. Always consult an experienced attorney in specific situations.

By Connie Reguli

So this information just came in on the ABA parent representation listserve.

    Dear Parent Advocates:

    I’m very excited to report to you that Rep. Gwen Moore, a  life-long champion of family-centered child welfare reforms, has just introduced H.R. 7976 in Congress.  This bill’s central focus is on suspending the ASFA    timeline requiring states to petition for termination of parental rights if a child has been in care for 15 of the most recent 22 months.

    Rep. Moore has issued the attached statement in support of the bill.  Here  is the entry on Congress.Gov:

https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/house-bill/7976/tex

    <https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/house-bill/7976/text>t.

The text of the bill is attached to this email but we expect the actual bill     text with the bill number to be available at this link soon.   The release that Rep. Moore’s office just issued is attached below this email.

    The following is directed to this listserve specifically. The bill would, if passed, make it clear that states do not have to file petitions for termination of parental rights during times of public health crisis.  It does so in two ways: (1) by directly suspending the requirement of filing a petition for termination of parental rights during any public health crisis that has been declared federally or in the state, and (2) expanding the list of “compelling reasons” not to petition for termination to include times of “public health crisis.” The bill also proposes a one-year time frame after public health emergencies are no longer in effect so that parents can resume services and in effect have some opportunity to make up for the terrible effects of the health crisis that set them back.    The bill also clarifies that reasonable efforts must continue and defines reasonable efforts more specifically by a variety of alternative methods for providing services during times of public health crisis.

    This bill is the result of very hard work by a number of members of this     listserve and others who have joined together to make draft proposals and    seek out Congressional support. Members of the strategic planning group for this effort include a number of National Alliance for Parent Representation Steering Committee members. The bill has strong bipartisan allies including leadership by A Texas Public Policy Foundation and ParentalRights.org  and the Shriver Center who have worked together to bring this issue to the attention of lawmakers.  The states that our working group members represent include the following (in the order of the names listed above), Illinois, New York, New Jersey, California. Pennsylvania, Oregon, Texas, and Virginia.

  Currently, our group is looking for more allies in every state who can help connect us to other groups that may support this bill and identify parents who have compelling stories of why they would need more than 15 months to reunite with their families, especially during times of public help crisis.

     We especially are looking for people who help in states where we don’t yet have active representation in our group. We have had a few folks volunteer to be in our new state network from additional states, but if you are from a state that isn’t listed here and have any political connections or    connections to groups that you think would be in support of the bill, please contact me and I will let you know of next steps for this network of advocates.

    We also view this bill as providing a means of educating members of     Congress as to the real-life harm to children and families of too-speedy    termination especially in times o COVID. This will help Congressmembers    gain a better picture than the media often presents about what the    timelines actually mean.  The bill is consistent with the guidance we have    seen from the Children’s Bureau but it goes further by actually providing    in law the clarity that termination of parental rights is not required states will not forfeit federal dollars if they do not petition for TPR.

    Thank you  Diane Redleaf Co-chair, United Family Advocates Principal, Family Defense Consulting

    Member, Steering Committee, National Alliance for Parent Representation Congresswoman Gwen Moore Introduces the Suspend the Timeline Not Parental Rights During a Public Health Crisis Act*

    Today, Congresswoman Moore introduced H.R. 7976, legislation to pause the federal timeframe for states to file a petition to terminate parental    rights for a child and guarantee that states do not receive federal funding    cuts due to this change in policy. In response, she released the following    statement:

    “COVID-19 has created great uncertainty for many, causing millions to face housing, health, food, and job insecurity. It has also hindered parents    from being able to utilize the services now unavailable in the COVID    closedown that would normally help them reunify with their children. This unprecedented crisis should not lead to permanent damage to families    because of a federal timeline created before this pandemic.”

    This bill already has bipartisan backing from numerous advocacy groups across the aisle, who note the importance of preserving children’s family   ties:

    “Parents who were diligently working services required to provide a safe,  stable home for their children suddenly, and through no fault of their own, found themselves unable to access these services due to COVID-19    pandemic-related lockdowns,” said *Andrew C. Brown, Distinguished Senior  Fellow of Child and Family Policy with the Texas Public Policy Foundation*.

    “But the clock continues to run on arbitrary case timelines governing    termination of parental rights, robbing them of precious time. A temporary  suspension of termination timelines gives these parents a fair opportunity    to restore their families and honors their decision to take personal    responsibility by doing the hard work necessary to achieve reunification.”

    “Children in foster care have a heightened need and clear right to visit    their parents. At the start of the pandemic, many child welfare agencies    suspended in-person family time for children and their parents and    siblings. Before the pandemic, many of these children would have been returned to their  families, but agencies have been unable to provide the services needed to facilitate reunification. We should not allow this pandemic to lead to   unnecessary permanent termination of parent-child relationships,” *Jey Rajaraman, Chief Counsel, Family Representation Project, Legal Services of New Jersey*.

    “We should not allow the unprecedented challenges of this public health  situation to take away a family’s chance to reunite. Children deserve the    right to be with their families whenever safely possible,” *Chris Gottlieb,    Co-Director, NYU School of Law, Family Defense Clinic*.

    *Rep. Gwen Moore has long been a leader on child welfare reform.  She looks forward to working with her colleagues from both parties to ensure these families are given the opportunity they deserve to safely reunify. COVID has led to an immense amount of uncertainty in the lives of families  struggling with poverty.  This bill prevents a temporary, though severe,    health crisis from causing irrevocable separation of children from their    parents and a permanent loss of their vital family times who have lost the    opportunities every family deserves.*

    Read more information about the legislation *here    <https://gwenmoore.house.gov/uploadedfiles/background_information_on_the_suspend_the_timeline_not_parental_rights_during_a_public_health_crisis_act_.pdf>.*

By Connie Reguli July 12, 2020

In the Eastern District of Kentucky, the Court has denied summary judgment on substantive and procedural due process claims where the social worker threatened a Mother to put her child under an “immediate protection agreement” regarding her three year old daughter when her child had a bite mark on her back. The child reported to her grandmother that a child in her daycare had bitten her. The grandmother reported it to the daycare and the daycare called in a referral claiming that the bite mark did not appear to have come from a child. Holliday v. Leigh, et al, 2:17-cv-113, E.D.KY June 15, 2020.

CHFS social worker Alecia Leigh went to the day care and attempt to interview the child. When the child’s mother, Maureen Holliday came to pick up her daughter, Leigh refused to let Mother have the child and insisted on a separate interview of the Mother. Mother asked to have someone present and Leigh refused. Leigh then told the Mother that she was under a Prevention Plan and Mother was limited to supervised contact only with the child.

The investigation lagged. However, the interviews that were conducted exonerated the Mother. In spite of compelling evidence that the child was not in harm’s way in Mother’s care, the plan remained in place. From October 2016 to January 2017, Mother remained under the plan and had limited contact with her daughter. Finally, the case was dismissed.

The Court denied summary judgment on substantive and procedural due process finding that the prevention plan violated Mother’s parenting rights and that it was secured under duress. Mother was not advised of her rights and was never provided a hearing on the prevention plan. The Court also denied summary judgment on the procedural due process right of Mother which requires notice and the opportunity to be heard. The Court denied the defense of qualified immunity, in part, in reliance on Schulkers v. Kammer, 367 F. Supp. 3d 626 (E.D.Ky 2019)

The Court also found that Leigh’s supervisor was liable because the plaintiff need only show that a supervisory official implicitly authorized, approved, or knowingly acquiesced in the unconstitutional conduct of the offending subordinate. Coley v. Lucas Cty., 799 F. 3d 530, 543 (6th Cir. 2015).

The Court also refused to dismiss the state claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress.

However, the District Court did grant summary judgment on the prayer for punitive damages in a civil rights case. The court stated that the Plaintiff must show that the Defendant was motivated by evil motive or intent, or when it involves reckless or callous indifference to the federally protected rights of others. Citing Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 56 (1983).

The court stated that Sec. 1983 presupposes that damages that compensate for actual harm ordinarily suffice to deter constitutional violations, therefore punitive damages are only permitted in particularly egregious situations. The conduct must be so egregious that it cannot be remedied by compensatory damages.

The Holliday decision is good for families and shows a small step towards constitutional fairness for families while dealing with the state-run child welfare agencies.

By Connie Reguli June 28 2020

Don’t y’all ever say your voice does not matter. I have worked with an amazing group of citizen lobbyists since 2016 who have sacrificed their time and money to traipse to DC and their state capitols for reform of the child welfare / family court dysfunction in this country.

We started in 2016 and every year we would go to DC sometimes two three and four times just to hold signs on the street or walk the halls of the legislative offices. We would tell legislative aids and service employees and policy makers and congressmen and senators about the destruction of families and the perversion of federal funding. We carried personal stories and courtroom horrors. We left flyers and I even made a three hundred page book of stories told by families across this country.

In Feb 2018 the Family First Preservation and Services Act passed but was not implemented. So we kept at it. In December 2018, ACF Jerry Milner issued a letter to enhance funding for parent representation. In 2019 we supported and followed the Family First Support Act and it was signed by Pres Trump In December 2019.

In June 2020 President Trump signed an executive order demanding that HIS federal agency HHS get the best practices guidelines completed to accomplished the goals of The Family First Act and more. He demanded that states report to the agency data that will allow new metrics in the federal funding requirements. He supports family preservation, kinship care, and more support services for families. The entire order is covered in a previous blog.

The states must do their part. I prepared a state level Family First Act for Tennessee but no legislator would carry it because it was too overwhelming for them to process and made such dramatic changes to the child welfare system that they knew the governor’s state agencies would push back. The bureaucratic slugs 🐌 would not want to change their practices.

Now, more than ever, your citizen voice matters. Contact your legislators in DC and let them know that this is not enough. We need to ban Adoption and Safe Families Act bonus dollars that the states receive for stranger adoptions which favor rehoming children over maintaining connections to their family of origin.

Join us at Family Forward Project Facebook.

By Connie Reguli

In January 2020, I discovered S. 3236, the “Unborn Child Support Act.” This bill was sponsored by a bevy of Republicans, Cramer (ND), Daines (MT), Hyde-Smith (MS), Cotton (AR), Inhofe (OK), and Blackburn (TN). In reading the language of the bill, I can’t help but think that this is auxiliary legislation for pro-life conservatives to codify the definition of life.

This legislation amends 42 U.S.C. 654 requiring the states to amend Section 454 of their state plan requirements. In laymen’s language, the State must have a plan to collect Federal tax payer funds under Title IV D of the Social Security Act for the purposes of child support enforcement. The current plan has certain requirements like seeking child support against a parent within ten days of a child being placed in state’s custody; and requirement of a state collection system in which wage garnishments and tax refund captures are collected and distributed. The States also received incentive payments to dollars collected, dollars ordered (the child support obligation), and collections on arrearages.

Does this plan work? Well as a practicing attorney I say ‘no’. I have seen too many due process violations, falsely imputed income, miscalculations, and failures to respond to modification requests. Just like any government run bureaucracy, no, it does not work well at all.

But back to S. 3236. It says the term “unborn child” means a member of the species homo sapiens, at any stage of development, who is carried in the womb.” This bill is intended to establish and enforce child support obligations of the biological father of an unborn child which will start with the first month in which the child was conceived, as determined by a physician. Payments may be retroactively collected and awarded, including the case where paternity is established subsequent to the birth of the child. Any measure to establish the paternity of a child (born or unborn) shall not be required without the consent of the mother, and no procedure for determining paternity shall occur if it should pose a risk of harm to the child. The effective date is two years after enactment.

So this bill brings a few new questions to my mind: (1) does this mean that the father (who has traditionally had some parental rights from the date of birth of the child) now have legal standing regarding decisions related to the welfare of the unborn child. For instance, if the Father disagrees with a decision for an abortion, can he object and force the Mother to carry to full term and give birth. Now, the Father has no rights in the child’s or mother’s health decision prior to the birth of the child. (2) child support includes a consideration for the costs of food, clothing, and housing for the child. Is this unborn child support obligation something less that the full amount required by an obligor supporting a born child. (3) under current law, a mother who receives federal funds such a ADC payments must report the identity of the father so that the state can go after them to collect support/reimbursement. This law says that paternity testing cannot be done before or after birth without the consent of the Mother. What is a Father WANTS a paternity test? Now the Mother can refuse…..?

Congress.gov shows that this bill is still in Senate Finance Committee and was last read January 28, 2020. This site is not the most accurate up to date information (as I have been informed by Senators and Congressmen) but it’s the best public source we have.

We will sit on a wait and see with this one………..

By Connie Reguli June 25 2020

On Wednesday June 24 2020 President Trump signed an executive order on child welfare. Again the emphasis is on families.

With all of the major national issues swarming and demanding his attention, ie, pandemic, riots, etc., I am wondering g how this important, but under the radar issue finally made it to his desk. I want to believe that the 1,000 postcards and 300 letters we sent from Family Forward Project may have helped. I want to believe that our multiple trips to DC as grassroots lobbyists and citizens helped. I want to believe that Senator Grassley who has been a warrior for child welfare carried this to his desk. Something or someone helped moved this to his attention. Don’t ever believe that your voice does not matter.

This order puts a demand on the states to produce the stats to show that they are complying with the changes made in 2018 under the Family First Preservatives and Services Act. The states were supposed to implement it by October 2018 then it was pushed back a year then another year. This order is a kick in the pants to those who won’t comply.

Next step is to ban the adoption bonus money under Adoption and Safe Families Act and then to tie federal funding under Title IVE to results that restore family integrity in this country.

In February 2018, the same day FFPSA (Family First Preservation and Services Act) passed, the National Counsel of State Courts hosted a forum for a new vision in child welfare including the reduction in the need to foster care.

In December 2018 Children’s Bureau Jerry Milner issued a permissive guideline for states to use Title IVE funds to improve the quality of parent representation.

In April 2019 the National Family Drug Court published guidelines for helping maintain families with substance abuse issues.

In July 2019 Children’s Bureau Jerry Milner issued a statement for a new vision for child welfare which was published by the ABA journal.

In December 2019 President Trump signed the Family First Support Act to provide additional funds for family preservation programs.

Tennessee held a forum on child welfare and yet parents are not included in the discussion. This is a reflection of the problem. No one wants to hear from the grassroots participants who suffer from the incompetence of child welfare agencies.

And yet the states continue to drag their feet in initiating effective legislation, hearings, and oversight to implement this dramatic paradigm shift in child welfare.

The TEETH in this change will be in funding. If we can cut funding to the W.H.O. for withholding information and working against our interest we can do the same here. The battle cry must be END the FUNDING.

HERE is the full executive order. 👇

Executive Order on Strengthening the Child Welfare System for America’s Children

June 24, 2020

By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, it is hereby ordered as follows:

Section 1.  Purpose.  Every child deserves a family.  Our States and communities have both a legal obligation, and the privilege, to care for our Nation’s most vulnerable children.

The best foster care system is one that is not needed in the first place.  My Administration has been focused on prevention strategies that keep children safe while strengthening families so that children do not enter foster care unnecessarily.  Last year, and for only the second time since 2011, the number of children in the foster care system declined, and for the third year in a row, the number of children entering foster care has declined.

But challenges remain.  Too many young people who are in our foster care system wait years before finding the permanency of family.  More than 400,000 children are currently in foster care.  Of those, more than 124,000 children are waiting for adoption, with nearly 6 out of 10 (58.4 percent) having already become legally eligible for adoption.

More than 50 percent of the children waiting for adoption have been in foster care — without the security and constancy of a permanent family — for 2 years or more.  The need for stability and timely permanency is particularly acute for children 9 years and older, children in sibling groups, and those with intellectual or physical disabilities.

Even worse, too many young men and women age out of foster care having never found a permanent, stable family.  In recent years, approximately 20,000 young people have aged out of foster care each year in the United States.  Research has shown that young people who age out of the foster care system are likely to experience significant, and significantly increased, life challenges — 40 percent of such young people studied experienced homelessness; 50 percent were unemployed at age 24; 25 percent experienced post-traumatic stress disorder; and 71 percent became pregnant by age 21.  These are unacceptable outcomes.

Several factors have contributed to the number of children who wait in foster care for extended periods.  First, State and local child welfare agencies often do not have robust partnerships with private community organizations, including faith-based organizations.  Second, those who step up to be resource families for children in foster care — including kin, guardians, foster parents, and adoptive parents — may lack adequate support.  Third, too often the processes and systems meant to help children and families in crisis have instead created bureaucratic barriers that make it more difficult for these children and families to get the help they need.

It is the goal of the United States to promote a child welfare system that reduces the need to place children into foster care; achieves safe permanency for those children who must come into foster care, and does so more quickly and more effectively; places appropriate focus on children who are waiting for adoption, especially those who are 9 years and older, are in sibling groups, or have disabilities; and decreases the proportion of young adults who age out of the foster care system.

Children from all backgrounds have the potential to become successful and thriving adults.  Yet without a committed, loving family that can provide encouragement, stability, and a lifelong connection, some children may never receive the support needed to realize that potential.

This order will help to empower families who answer the call to open their hearts and homes to children who need them.  My Administration is committed to helping give as many children as possible the stability and support that family provides by dramatically improving our child welfare system.

Sec. 2.  Encouraging Robust Partnerships Between State Agencies and Public, Private, Faith-based, and Community Organizations.  (a)  In order to facilitate close partnerships between State agencies and nongovernmental organizations, including public, private, faith-based, and community groups, the Secretary of Health and Human Services (the “Secretary”) shall provide increased public access to accurate, up-to-date information relevant to strengthening the child welfare system, including by:

(i)    Publishing data to aid in the recruitment of community support.  Within 1 year of the date of this order and each year thereafter, the Secretary shall submit to the President, through the Assistant to the President for Domestic Policy, a report that provides information about typical patterns of entry, recent available counts of children in foster care, and counts of children waiting for adoption.  To the extent appropriate and consistent with applicable law, including all privacy laws, this data will be disaggregated by county or other sub-State level, child age, placement type, and prior time in care.

(ii)   Collecting needed data to preserve sibling connections.

(A)  Within 2 years of the date of this order, the Secretary shall collect information from appropriate State and local agencies on the number of children in foster care who have siblings in foster care and who are not currently placed with their siblings.

(B)  Within 3 years of the date of this order, to support the goal of keeping siblings together (42 U.S.C. 671(a)(31)(A)), the Secretary shall develop data analysis methods to report on the experience of children entering care in sibling groups, and the extent to which they are placed together.  The Secretary’s analysis shall also assess the extent to which siblings who are legally eligible for adoption achieve permanency together.

(iii)  Expanding the number of homes for children and youth.

(A)  Within 2 years of the date of this order, the Secretary shall develop a more rigorous and systematic approach to collecting State administrative data as part of the Child and Family Services Review required by section 1123A of the Social Security Act (the “Act”) (42 U.S.C. 1320a–2a).  Data collected shall include:

(1)  demographic information for children in foster care and waiting for adoption;

(2)  the number of currently available foster families and their demographic information;

(3)  the average foster parent retention rate and average length of time foster parents remain certified;

(4)  a target number of foster homes needed to meet the needs of children in foster care; and

(5)  the average length of time it takes to complete foster and adoptive home certification.

(B)  The Secretary shall ensure, to the extent consistent with applicable law, that States report to the Secretary regarding strategies for coordinating with nongovernmental organizations, including faith-based and community organizations, to recruit and support foster and adoptive families.

(b)  Within 1 year of the date of this order, the Secretary shall issue guidance to Federal, State, and local agencies on partnering with nongovernmental organizations.  This guidance shall include best practices for information sharing, providing needed services to families to support prevention of children entering foster care, family preservation, foster and adoptive home recruitment and retention, respite care, post-placement family support, and support for older youth.  This guidance shall also make clear that faith-based organizations are eligible for partnerships under title IV-E of the Act (42 U.S.C. 670 et seq.), on an equal basis, consistent with the First Amendment to the Constitution.

Sec. 3.  Improving Access to Adequate Resources for Caregivers and Youth.  While many public, private, faith based, and community resources and other sources of support exist, many American caregivers still lack connection with and access to adequate resources.  Within 1 year of the date of this order, the Secretary shall equip caregivers and those in care to meet their unique challenges, by:

(a)  Expanding educational options.  To the extent practicable, the Secretary shall use all existing technical assistance resources to promote dissemination and State implementation of the National Training and Development Curriculum, including, when appropriate, in non-classroom environments.

(b)  Increasing the availability of trauma-informed training.  The Secretary shall provide an enhanced, web-based, learning-management platform to house the information generated by the National Adoption Competency Mental Health Training Initiative.  Access to this web-based training material will be provided free of charge for all child welfare and mental health practitioners.

(c)  Supporting guardianship.  The Secretary shall provide information to States regarding the importance and availability of funds to increase guardianship through the title IV-E Guardianship Assistance Program (42 U.S.C. 673), which provides Federal reimbursement for payments to guardians and for associated administrative costs.  This information shall include which States have already opted into the program.

(d)  Enhancing support for kinship care and youth exiting foster care.  The Secretary shall establish a plan to address barriers to accessing existing Federal assistance and benefits for eligible individuals.

Sec. 4.  Ensuring Equality of Treatment and Access for all Families.  The Howard M. Metzenbaum Multiethnic Placement Act of 1994 (the “Multiethnic Placement Act”) (Public Law 103-382), as amended, prohibits agencies from denying to any person the opportunity to become an adoptive or a foster parent on the basis of race, color, or national origin (42 U.S.C. 671(a)(18)(A)); prohibits agencies from delaying or denying the placement of a child for adoption or into foster care on the basis of race, color, or national origin (id. 671(a)(18)(B)); and requires agencies to diligently recruit a diverse base of foster and adoptive parents to better reflect the racial and ethnic makeup of children in out-of-home care (id. 662(b)(7)).  To further the goals of the Multiethnic Placement Act, the Secretary shall:

(a)  within 6 months of the date of this order, initiate a study regarding the implementation of these requirements nationwide;

(b)  within 1 year of the date of this order, update guidance, as necessary, regarding implementation of the Multiethnic Placement Act; and

(c)  within 1 year of the date of this order, publish guidance regarding the rights of parents, prospective parents, and children with disabilities (including intellectual, developmental, or physical disabilities).

Sec. 5.  Improving Processes to Prevent Unnecessary Removal and Secure Permanency for Children.  (a)  Federal Review of Reasonable Effort Determinations and Timeliness Requirements.

(i)    Within 2 years of the date of this order, the Secretary shall require that both the title IV-E reviews conducted pursuant to 45 CFR 1356.71 and the Child and Family Services Reviews conducted pursuant to 45 CFR 1355.31–1355.36 specifically and adequately assess the following requirements:

(A)  reasonable efforts to prevent removal;

(B)  filing a petition for Termination of Parental Rights within established statutory timelines and court processing of such petition, unless statutory exemptions apply;

(C)  reasonable efforts to finalize permanency plans; and

(D)  completion of relevant required family search and notifications and how such efforts are reviewed by courts.

(ii)   In cases in which it is determined that statutorily required timelines and efforts have not been satisfied, the Secretary shall make use of existing authority in making eligibility determinations and disallowances consistent with section 1123A(b)(3)(4) of the Act (42 U.S.C. 1320a-2a(b)(3)(4)).

(iii)  Within 2 years of the date of this order, the Secretary shall develop metrics to track permanency outcomes in each State and measure State performance over time.

(iv)   Within 6 months of the date of this order, the Secretary shall provide guidance to States regarding flexibility in the use of Federal funds to support and encourage high-quality legal representation for parents and children, including pre-petition representation, in their efforts to prevent the removal of children from their families, safely reunify children and parents, finalize permanency, and ensure that their voices are heard and their rights are protected.  The Secretary shall also ensure collection of data regarding State use of Federal funds for this purpose.

(b)  Risk and Safety Assessments.

(i)   Within 18 months of the date of this order, the Secretary shall collect States’ individual standards for conducting risk and safety assessments required under section 106(b)(2)(B)(iv) of the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act (42 U.S.C. 5106(b)(2)(B)(iv)).

(ii)  Within 2 years of the date of this order, the Secretary shall outline reasonable best practice standards for risk and safety assessments, including how to address domestic violence and substance abuse.

Sec. 6.  Indian Child Welfare Act.  Nothing in this order shall alter the implementation of the Indian Child Welfare Act or replace the tribal consultation process.

Sec. 7.  General Provisions.  (a)  Nothing in this order shall be construed to impair or otherwise affect:

(i)   the authority granted by law to an executive department or agency, or the head thereof; or

(ii)  the functions of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget relating to budgetary, administrative, or legislative proposals.

(b)  This order shall be implemented consistent with applicable law and subject to the availability of appropriations.

(c)  This order is not intended to, and does not, create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or in equity by any party against the United States, its departments, agencies, or entities, its officers, employees, or agents, or any other person.

DONALD J. TRUMP

THE WHITE HOUSE,
June 24, 2020.

By Connie Reguli – June 9, 2020

Please share this horrid story out of East Tennessee.

Two children adopted out of foster care were murdered and buried in the yard by the foster-to-adopt parents.

They continued to collect adoption assistance.  In my public presentations, I tell the public that I feared that adopted children were killed or trafficked and here ya’ go.

The statements of the Tennessee Commissioner are telling.  She says that after adoption the state has no right to “check-up” on adopted children.

This ignores the fact that the State approves this parents, does their home study, and continues to provide money to them.

This system is broken.

Oxygen story – June 9, 2020.

Posted: May 27, 2020 / 02:22 PM EDT / Updated: May 27, 2020 / 02:22 PM EDT

News Channel 11 – May 27, 2020 – KINGSTON, Tenn. (AP) — Arrest warrants in a Tennessee couple’s abuse case describe a hellish existence for four children in their legal custody, a nightmare that finally ended after a little boy was spotted walking alone along a Roane County road.

Passersby called 911, and a responding officer began asking questions. The boy’s legal guardian soon confessed, the warrants said, to burying the remains of a little girl in a barn and locking a 15-year-old boy in the basement for four years.

The two other children spent time in a wire dog cage, while all were supposedly homeschooled and appeared to be “stunted in growth,” the warrants said.

Michael Anthony Gray Sr., 63, and his wife, Shirley Ann Gray, 60, were arrested Monday on charges of aggravated child abuse, especially aggravated kidnapping, aggravated child neglect and abuse of a corpse, authorities said.

The surviving children, ages 11 to 15, were removed from their custody by the state Department of Children’s Services.

The oldest had been locked in the partially flooded, unfinished basement for stealing food shortly after the family moved to the home in June 2016, authorities said, “and had no contact with anyone outside the basement, only given small amounts of food, being white bread and some water,” the warrants state.

Michael Gray told authorities that the girl was about 10 when she died in 2017, a few months after she too was locked in the basement, and that he buried her inside a barn in the backyard, the warrants said. Investigators found her skeletal remains on Saturday, the day after the 911 call, according to 9th Judicial District Attorney General Russell Johnson.

The Grays also built a tiny concrete room under the stairs for punishment, the warrants said. Authorities who liberated the older boy on Friday said he was surrounded by feces, garbage and mold.

The warrants say Shirley Gray claimed all four children were keeping up with their homeschooling requirements, but two of them “appear to have no formal education,” and “were, in fact, amazed by what a refrigerator does when they observed one in their foster home.”

The Grays remained in custody on Wednesday. It wasn’t immediately clear whether they have an attorney.

cdn.fbsbx.com/v/t59.2708-21/100897313_1177169635959152_8142646505837166592_n.pdf/URGENT-ACTION-MASS-1.pdf

By Connie Reguli

Many times, families are silenced by the Courts to prevent them from publishing their frustrations about Court proceedings. This type of restraint should not be allowed nor tolerated in our country. There are many cases prohibiting “prior restraint” when it come to our First Amendment freedoms.

In Federal Court, the implement “rules” against public dissemination of information about the case, presumably because it could affect the right of both parties to a fair and impartial jury. However, does social media really have such a broad reach to audiences that it would have a detrimental effect on a jury. And really, could this not be resolved in voir dire.

Recently, I was threatened on this very issue. I participate in social media platforms that are critical of the government and sometimes, challenge the operation of the Courts. In a pending Federal lawsuit, I made a disclosure about defendants regarding the corruption uncovered in this rural Tennessee county.

Within days, I received threatening letters claiming that Local Rule 83.04 prohibited such comments in social media.

So I found the reference below. In Ohio, the Federal Court has found this restriction to be unconstitutional………..Nice to Know.

Trial judges, the government, the lawyers and the public must tolerate robust and at times acrimonious or even silly public debate about litigation. The courts are public institutions funded with public revenues for the purpose of resolving public disputes, and the right of publicity concerning their operations goes to the heart of their function under our system of civil liberty. The courts have available other less restrictive approaches for insuring a fair trial. They may, for example, consider a change of venue or the sequestration of the jury or a searching voir dire examination of the jury.

The Court hereby finds that DR 7-107(G) is facially unconstitutional because it violates the over breadth doctrine as DR 7-107(G) is capable of being applied to punish attorneys for constitutionally protected speech or conduct and therefore, in the Court’s view, “reaches a substantial amount of constitutionally protected conduct.” Leonardson, 896 F.2d at 195. DR 7-107(G) has a chilling effect in that it prohibits attorney speech in civil litigation that is otherwise protected by the First Amendment. Accordingly, the Court finds that DR 7-107(G) is over broad because it does not aim specifically at certain evils, but it sweeps within its reach other speech that is constitutionally protected. See Thornhill, 310 U.S. at 97.

The Court also finds that DR 7-107(G) is facially unconstitutional pursuant to the vagueness doctrine. DR 7-107(G) is void for vagueness since its provisions do not provide adequate warnings to all regarding what is permitted and what is proscribed by law. See Richardson v. City of South Euclid, 904 F.2d 1050, 1056 (6th Cir. 1990) (Merritt, C.J., dissenting); Grayned, 408 U.S. at 108. Thus, like Rule 177 as construed in Gentile, DR 7-107(G) with its somewhat ambiguous categories “creates a trap for the wary as well as the unwary.” Gentile, 111 S. Ct. at 1132. Moreover, DR 7-107(G) gives the disciplinary board considerable discretion in determining who will be disciplined and who will not be disciplined. Accordingly, DR 7-107(G) is void pursuant to the vagueness doctrine.

Wachsman v. Disciplinary Counsel Supreme Court

United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio, Eastern Division

September 30, 1991, Filed Case C-2-90-335

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has ruled that a civil litigant’s First Amendment rights were violated when a U.S. district court judge ordered him to stop writing letters to shareholders of a bank that had sued him. Sept 2019. Bank of Hope v. Chon.

By Connie Reguli

March 22, 2020, Arizona Supreme Court decided that where TPR is sought for nonabused children as well as an abused child, the court must find risk of harm to the nonabused children by clear and convincing evidence in the substantive grounds phase, not merely in the best interests phase.

“Thus, a juvenile court may terminate a parent’s rights to non-abused children under § 8-533(B)(2) only if the extrapolation of unfitness—the risk of harm to such children—is proven by clear and convincing evidence. No application of the statute may circumvent this fundamental constitutional requirement.”

“ In sum, a juvenile court’s extrapolation of parental unfitness will not pass constitutional muster under Santosky unless the risk of harm to non-abused children is proven by clear and convincing evidence.”

SANDRA R., SERGIO C., Appellants, v. DEPARTMENT OF CHILD SAFETY, M.R., F.M., J.M., Appellees., No. CV-19-0057-PR, 2020 WL 1161588, at *6 (Ariz. Mar. 11, 2020).